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IN THE SUPREME; C.OURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FERN GRAY and LEILA GRAY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No. 852'4

EDWARD R. STEVENS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal by Edward R. Stevens from a
judgment in favor of the Grays quieting title to a home
owned by the respondents as joint tenants, located in
Payson, Utah County, Utah.
The respondents claim the property as a homestead.
In their claim of a homestead, respondents seek to have
the full amount of the homestead provided for by U.C.A,
1955-28-1-1, in the sum of $2750.00 made exempt from
a judgment lien of the appellant out of the interest of
Fern Gray in and to the home jointly owned by them.
The Court below so held and decreed that such home
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and the whole thereof was freed from appellant's judgment lien. It is from such judgment that this appeal is
taken. Appellant, however, does not claim that respondents do not have a right to an exemption of $2750.00,
but he does contend that such exemption does not relieve
the property from the judgment lien of the appellant
in and to the interest of Fern Gray in and to the property
which they had occupied as their home shortly before
the trial of this case, and which they had vacated pursuant to an oral agree to dispose of the same.
A summary of the evidence received at the trial and
which is brought here for review by a transcript thereof is necessary to an understanding of the matters concerning which appellant complains.
The respondent, Fern Gray, in substance testified
as follows:
That he is plaintiff in this case and resides at
Springlake; that he is the husband of Leila Gray, the
other plaintiff herein; that he acquired the home here
involved in March 1941 (Tr. 3). That he made the first
payment of $600.00 plus interest, making $762.00 in 1941
and the next pa~~11ent of $600.00 "Tas made in 1942. That
the first pay1nent was 'vith n1oney he received from the
sale of cattle 'vhich he o\vned in ''Tyo1ning \Yith Kenneth
Dix. ( Tr. 4). That the 1noney did not come from any
profits 1nade out of his partnership with Mr. Stevens.
That the p,artnership w·ith 1\Ir. Stevens came to an end
on March 3, 193~; that "'"hen the partnership came to an
end, he was in debt $4500.00. That the 1noney he paid
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on the purchase of the home came from a joint bank
account of himself and wife; that he did not acquire
title to the property until 1949, but took possession in
1941. ( Tr. 5) That the property was taken in the joint
names of the witness and his wife; that the property was
mortgaged to pay off the debts of plaintiffs (Tr. 6).
That the wife of the witness had money of her own
which she received from the sale of the cattle business,
'vhich money she put into the purchase of the home in
controversy. (Tr. 7) The money to pay for the home
came out of the joint checking account; that the wife of
the witness worked at Gray's Drive Inn (Tr. 8) That
there is a second mortgage on the home (Tr. 9) That
the second mortgage was made out in 1953 and is for
$1100.00; that there was a note given in 1950 by the son
and the son's wife for $1100.00 signed by the witness
and the wife of the witness for $1100.00; that the note
was for money borrowed by the witness and his wife
(Tr. 10) that the money o'ving on the note is around
$1600.00. The witness was asked:

''I call your attention, 11r. Gray, to your complaint which states $1588.00. Which is correct
$1600.00 or the 1588.00 ~"
To which he answered :

"'Vell, there has been quite a little paid since
that w.as drawn up."
"Q. But at the time you filed your

complaint~

A. It was $1588.00.
Q. That includes principal and

interest~
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A. Yes.
Q. Has anything been paid on this at all~

A. Not a dime." (Tr. 11)
Mr. Gray further testified that he was living with
his wife when he made his declaration of homestead·
'
that he declared the homestead upon his interest to protect his own rights. ( Tr. 12). That the cash value of
the property is $12,000.00. (Tr. 13).
The second mortgage, the deed to the property, the
note and the homestead declaration were marked and received in evidence as Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
On cross-examination, Mr. Gray testified that his son
had been in possession of the note since it was given;
that when the mortgage was given to secure the note, he
knew that there was about to be a very substantial judgment rendered against hin1; that he gave the mortgage
for the purpose of prefering the clailn of his son over
the judgment. (Tr. 17.) That the witness ,,~as a defendant in an action brought by l\{r. Stevens in which a finding was made "rr,hat in addition to tl1e foregoing money
charge.able against the defendant, he is chargeable with
31 head of partnership cattle appropriated by him for his
own use and benefit; that the date the defendant appropriated such cattle is so1ne,vhat uncertain, but as the
last partnership cattle 'vere sold on or about 1\farch 4,
1939, the defendant is chargeable "~ifu said cattle as of
March 4, 1939, at a price of $84.41, 'Yhich "~as the average
price that was received fro1n the partnership cattle and
the defendant is chargeable for sueh cattle tl1e sum of
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$2,616.71 ;" that the witness knew of such finding and
that the srune wasn't true. (Tr. 18). That in 1940 the·
witness bought from J onny B. Jones 100 and some odd
cattle; that he did not have these cattle 'vhile he was
in partnership with !:Ir. Stevens. (Tr. 19) In ans,ver
to the question "when did you buy these cattle that you
sold and put the money into this home," the witnes1s
answered "now, listen, I bought cattle in 39, March
or 29, Pratt Thomas cattle." that the cattle of Stevens
and Gray were .all gone March 3, 1939 ; that the witness
never had the 31 head of cattle that the court found he·
misappropriated; that the partnership with Stevens extended from 1936 until the spring of 1939. (Tr. 20). That
he borro,ved the money from the Utah Livestock Credit
Corporation with which to buy the cattle from Jones.
(Tr. 20-21). That the witness is not now willing or able
to account for where that money 'vent from the sale of
those 31 head of cattle, because he never had them. (Tr.
21). That the witness does not remember if he stated
in his homestead declaration that the Payson property
was worth $12,500.00; that the Payson property is not
worth more than $12,000.00; that he is to get $9,000.00
and a little home in Springlake for the Payson property.
(Tr. 22) ; that the Springlake property is not worth over
$3,000.00. (Tr. 24) That the witness does not know
whether the deal for the disposal of the Payson property and the receiving of the Springlake property has
been called off. (Tr. 24).

2J"

On redirect e~xamination, the witness testified that
when the Stevens and Gray partnership was dissolved,
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he was in debt $4500.00; that he did not own any cattle
when the partnership was dissolved.
On recross examination, the witness testified that
he gave a mortgage on the cattle brought from Jones,
and did not give any other security. (Tr. 25).
The plaintiff Leila Gray in substance testified as
follows: r~rhat she is the wife of Fern Gray and resides
in Springlake and a joint owner with her husband of the
property in controversy; that she has made the payment
on the first mortgage on the Payson property. (Tr. 28).
That she sold some property belonging to her and used
the money to lease the Loose Ranch and go into the
cattle business with her husband and always had a joint
account 'Yith her husband. (Tr. 28). That she signed
the note and 1nortgage made out to her son and daughterin-law and used the $1100.00 to open up the drive-in in
Payson; that she claims a half interest in the Payson
property: that the Payson property has a \alue of $12~000.00 ( Tr. 29). On cross-exrunination she testified that
she didn't think she lost the 1uoney she put into the cattle
business at the Loose ranch. (Tr. 30-31). That the partnership proved a loss; that they did not n1ake any money
during the three years of the partnership; that with the
money n1ade 'vhile on the Loose R-anrh they bought and
sold property, .. ,Ye didn't buy any property, we bought
and sold cattle:~' that she 'ras in business as a partner
of her husband in buying and selling rattle; that she
signed notes "'"ith her husband in connection 'vith the
partnership between her husband .and Stevens, but was
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not in that deal. That she was opposed to it. ( Tr. 31) ·
That the witness and her husband al\vays had a joint
account and shared the profits and losses of the business;
that the other deals where money "\vas made or lost on
cattle were deals where she and her husband were partners (Tr. 32).
Richard Gray, a witness called by the plaintiffs,
testified in substance as follows:
That he is a son of the plaintiffs, that he loaned
some money to his father and r.aother; that his wife had
a bank account in a Salt Lake bank in the sum of $600.00
of which she drew out $500.00; that they had a bank
account at Payson of which they drew out $300.00 and
they had $300.00 in cash ;at hoine, making a total of
$1100.00 which they loaned to the plaintiffs in 1950 to
open up the drive-in in Payson. That the plaintiffs gave
a note at the time of the loan; tha:t the plaintiffs said
they would give the witness a mortgage on the home to
secure the note.
On cross-examination, he stated that he did not ask
to have the note secured; that the 1nortgage was given
by his parents on their own initiative. (Tr. 36). That
his parents came to him and said: "We are not giving
you a payment on this note because we gave you a
n1ortgage on the place." That all of the $1100.00 "\vas in
cash; that he never asked then1 for any payment, but he
expected them to pay. (Tr. 37).
Some additional evidence was offered as to the value
of the real property here involved by witnesses called
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by the plaintiff and by the defendant. Pearl Bigler
placed the value of the Payson property at $11,950.00
(Tr. 39) and the Springlake property at $3500.00. (Tr.
58). A Mr. Gale Barron used a somewhat unique theory
of values in that he said if a loan of $9,000.00 could be
secured on the Payson property it would be worth $12.000.00; that he has seen the Springlake property from
the street and in his opinion, it was worth $3500.00. (Tr.
.13). He stated that the usual manner of fixing market
value is all wrong. (Tr. 46) :Th1r. Burdick, a witness called

by defendant, placed the market value of the Payson
property at $12,200.00 (Tr. 49) and the Springlake property at $3,900.00. J\Ir. Elmer, a witness called by the defendant, placed the market value of the Payson property
at $12,000.00 (Tr. 53) and the Springlake property at
$3871.00 and by a different method at $3939.00. (Tr. 54).
!Ir. Gray testified that the amount owing on the first
mortgage on March 1st was $5830.96 and there was interest since that date 'vhich he had not con1puted. (Tr.
46-47). The files in the case "~here the judgment was
rendered which plaintiffs in their action seek to have
ihe court hold does not constitute a lien on the Payson
property \vas received in evidence. (Tr. 57). This, of
course, is a suit in equity and l1ence this court will review
both the la\v and the facts.
The appellant relies upon the following Points for
a reversal of the judgment appealed from:
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
T'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAIN·TIFF FERN GRAY HAS A HOlVIESTEAD EXEMPTION IN rrHE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF
FERN GR.AY IN THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND
THAT SU1CH HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IS $2750.00. (R. 12)
POINT II.
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN FINDING THA:T THE
INTEREST OF LEILA GRAY IN THE PRO·PER'TY HERE
INVOLVED IS A ONE-HALF THEREOF, IN ADDITION TO
HER RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLAIMED RIGHT
OF HER. HUSBAND FOR A HO·MESTEAD.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THA'T
RI'CHARD AND DEON GRAY HAVE A VALID AND BINDING MORTGAGE ON THE PREMISES HERE INVOLVED IN
THE SUM OF $1588.02 OR IN ANY OTHER SUM. (R. 12)
POIN'T IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ON
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE AND PARTICULARLY
IN FAILING TO FIND 'THAT THE PLAIN'TIFF FERN GRAY
MISAPPROPRIATED 31 HEAD OF ~CATTLE BELONGING
TO THE PARTNERSHIP OF GRAY AND STEVENS. (R. 12)
P·OINT· V.
THE TRIAL GOURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW THAT THE JUDGMENT OF EDWARD R. STEVENS
IS NOT A LIEN ON T'HE INTEREST OF FERN GRAY IN
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND IN ENTERING
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS FERN GRAY AND
LEILA GRAY QUIETING IN THEM THE TITLE TO THE
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PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED FREE FROM THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT EDWARD R.
STEVENS IN CASE NO. 14, 240 (R. 14-15)

ARGUMENT
The statutory laws of Utah that have a bearing on
the question presented for review in this appeal are:
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1, which provides that a homestead
shall consist of lands, appurtenances and improvements
not exceeding in value the sum of $2000.00 for the head
of the family and the further sum of $750.00 for the
spouse and $300.00 for each other n1ember of the family.
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-6 provides;
"If the homestead claimant is married, the
homestead may be selected from the separate property of the husband, or "ith the consent of the
wife from her separate property.'~
U. S. A. 1953, 48-1-22, subdivision (c) provides:
~'A

partner's right in specific partnership
property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership.
Where partnership property is attached for a
partnership debt, the partners, or any of them, or
the representatiYe of a deceased partner can not
clailn any right under the ho1nestead or exenlption la\vs."
It follows fron1 the proYisions of l 1.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1
ana U.C ....l\.., 1~)53, 48-1-22 that a husband or a wife, or
both husband and "~ife 'Yithout me1ubers of the family
are lilnited to a ho1ne~tead net Yalue of $2750.00. That
is to ~ay the value of the property after all valid liens
are deducted fron1 the actual value.
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POINT I.
T'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THA·T THE
PLAINTIFF FERN GRAY HAS A HOMESTEAD EXEMP·TION IN THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF
FERN GRAY IN THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND
THAT SUCH HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IS $2750.00. (R. 12)

It will be seen from the testimony of plaintiff Fern
Gray that:
1. A finding was made in the case of Stevens v.
Gray wherein the judgment was rendered which Gray
seeks to have declared not a lien on the property here
involved. The court found that Gray misappropriated
to his own use 31 head of partnership cattle of Stevens
and Gray of the value of $2616.71. (Tr. 18) and File No.
1424 (Tr. 57).

2. That he, Fern Gray, executed a mortgage in
favor of his son, Richard Gray, for the purpose of placing a lien on the Payson property which would be prior
in t~me to a judgment which he, Fern Gray, knew was
about to be entered in favor of the defendant herein,
Edward R. Stevens. (Tr. 17).
3. That Fern Gray received .a total of $3482.02 in
value of the 31 head of cattle and money out of the
Stevens-Gray partne-rship more than he put into the
partnership, while Stevens paid out $9007.16 more than

he received from the partnership. See finding No. 20
in Civil Case No. 14,240 which was received in evidence.
(Tr. 57).
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4. That all of the Gray-Stevens cattle were disposed
of on or about March 3,1939, (Tr. 5).
5. That on March 28 or 29, 1939 he, Fern Gray,
bought cattle from Pratt Thomas. (Tr. 20).
6. That in 1940 he bought about 100 head of cattle
from J onny B. Jones with money he borrowed from the
Utah Livestock Credit Corporation. That the first payment of $762.00 made on the home was with money he
received from the sale of cattle which he had in Wyoming with Kenneth Dix. (Tr. 4).

7. That the $600.00 plus interest that was used to
make the first payment on the purchase price of the
Payson property came from a joint account of Mr. Gray
and his wife. (Tr. 5).
8. That the plaintiffs ,,~ere engaged in several ventures and kept a joint bank account of their receipts and
expenses. ( Tr. 28-31, 32).
There is other testnnony given by :Jir. Gray which
is at variance "~ith testin1ony above referred to. Thus,
he testified that he did not get any n1oney from the sale
of the partnership cattle owned by him and ~Ir. Stevens.
He testified that he '"as in debt $4500.00 "~hen the partnership between hin1 and Stevens can1e to an end on
Marrh 3, 1939, ( Tr. 5) and yet "~ithin less than a month
after the partnership ca111e to an end, he bought cattle
from Pratt Thonla$. He does not tell us anything about
where he ree(~ived the n1oney '"ith 'rhich to buy the
Thomas cattle. He testified that the cattle he sold and
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used some of the money received from the sale w.as
purchased with money borrowed from the Utah Livestock Credit Corporation. (Tr. 21). It is to say the least
extremely improbable that the Utah Livestock Credit
Corporation, or any other money lender, will loan sufficient money to buy 100 head of cattle with no security
except a mortgage on the cattle purchased. Mr. Gray fails
to inform us of any money he received other than the
rnoney he must have received from the proceeds of the
sale of the Gray-Stevens cattle and particularly the 31
head that he misappropriated. He received $3482.02 more
out of the partnership with Stevens than he put in. The
court so found.
The law applicable to such a state of facts has received judicial application on numerous occasions. The
authorities are all to the effect that :
"A judgement rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter is
conclusive and undisputable evidence as to all
rights, questions or facts put in issue in the suit
and actually adjudicated thereon where the same
comes again into controversy between the same
parties or their privies, even though according to
the decision on the questions, the subsequent proceedings are on a different cause of action, since
the law abhors a multiplicity of suits."
50 C.J.S. page 168, Sec. 711.
To the same effect is the law stated in 50 C.J.S. page
141, Sec. 686. Among the numerous cases cited from
state and federal courts in support of the text are these
from Utah:
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Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Ut. 428; 132 P.ac. (2d) 111;
State v. Erw,in, 101 Ut. 365, 120 Pac. (2d) 285; Boland
v. Erwin, 79 Ut. 331; 10 p,ac. (2d) 930. Other Utah cases
are cited in the foregoing Utah cases.
So also is the law settled in this and other jurisdictions that the burden is on the one who claims a right
to a homeste.ad to establish the same. Zuniga v. Evans,
87, U t. 198, 48 Pac. ( 2d) 513; 101 A.L.R. 532; Gordon
v. Harper, 106 Ut. 560, 151 Pac. (2d) 99, 102; 154 A.L.R.
906.
So also do the authorities teach that if money is
misappropriated by a person and applied on the purchase of a homestead, the person or one in privity with
such person may not successfully claim a right to a homestead exemption as against the person whose money
has been misappropriated and applied on the payment
of the claimed homestead. Following are among the
authorities so holding: Gustan J. Warso, Jr. Admr. v.
Ashkosh Savings & Trust Co. 47 A.L.R. 366: 190 \~"'{is.
87; 208 N.vV. 886.
We quote the following fro1n the syllabi of the case
above cited in 47 A.L.R. 366:
"It was never contemplated nor intended that
a hon1estead shall he created and n1aintained "ith
stolen or en1bezzled property, or by wrongful.appropriation of property rightly belonging to another. If this were so, the statute exempting a
homestead instead of promoting the public welfare would operate as an imn1oral and baneful
influence undern1ining and destroying the fundamental principles of government."
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In 3 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. pp.
3297-2401 it is said:

"A constructive trust arises whenever ;another's property has been wrongfully appropriated and converted into a different form. Equity
impresses a constructive trust upon the new form
or species of property (where property is wrongfully taken) not only while it is in the hands of
the original wrongdoer, but as long as it can be
followed and identified in whosoever's hands it
may come, except into those of a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, and the court
will enforce the constructive trust for the benefit of the beneficial owner or original cestui que
trust who has thus been defrauded."
See also 47 A.L.R. 369, et seq. American Railway Express Con~pany v. Dolphus J. Hauli, et al, 48 A.L.R.
1266 et seq. Vle refr.ain from citing other authorities
because the law above cited see1ns to be of universal application as we have found none to the contrary.
There is a rule of law of general application which
is thus stated in 20 Am. Jur. 145-146:
"The ommission by a party to produce important testimony relating to a fact of which he
has knowledge and which is peculiarly within his
own control raises the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable in his
case. In such case the burden of coming forward
with proof is upon the party who wishes to support his case by a particular fact which lies more
· peculiarly within his own knowledge or of which
he is supposed to be cogniz.ant."
Numerous cases are cited in foot notes to the text which
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support the general rule as well as exceptions thereto.
Independent of the law just quoted, the burden of proof
was on the plaintiffs to establish the claimed homestead.
It is so held in the Utah cases heretofore cited. The defendant obviously could not know what the plaintiff,
Fern Gray, ultimately did with the profit of $3482.02
which he made out of the partnership with Stevens, and
in which Stevens took a loss of $9007.16. Plaintiff Fern
Gray contented himself with saying he did not get the
31 head of cattle. However, according to his own testimony he purchased some cattle from Pratt Thomas within a month after the Stevens-Gray partnership cattle
were all sold. He does not tell where he received the
money to buy the Bame, or when he sold the same, or what
he did with the money. According to the testimony of Mr.
Gray he bought some 100 odd cattle from J onny B. Jones
(Tr. 19). The only explanation he gave of where the
money came from to buy those cattle is the extremely
improbable statement that he borrowed the same from
the Utah Livestock Credit Corporation and gave a mortgage to secure the same. ( Tr. 21). These v.arious transactions, according to 11r. Gray, 'Yere all carried on by
checks drawn on a joint account of the plaintiffs herein.
(Tr. 7-8).
Under the facts established in this case the law thus
announced in 20 A1n. Jur. 145-6, Sec. 140 is especially
applicable.
"The broad rule prevails that the ormss1on
of a party to produce important testimony relating to a fact of which he has knowledge and which
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is peculiarly within his own control raises the
presumption that the testimony if produced, would
be unfavorable to his cause. In such case the
burden of coming forward with proof is upon the
part who wishes to support his case by .a particular fact which lies more peculiarly within his
knowledge, or of which he is supposed to be cognizant."
Among cases where· this rule of law has been applied are: City of Fort Smith vs. Dodson, 11 S.W. 687;
Fowler Parking Co. v. Erzenperger, 94 Pac. 995,; First
Nat'l Bank of Davenport v. Baker et .al, 10 N.W. 633;
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Swenk, 222 Ala. 496; 132 So.
728. In 130 A.L.R., page 480, and in 23 A.L.R. (2d) at
page 1271 will be found an annotation of the law now
being discussed. Numerous cases will be found collected
in 130 A. L. R. page 480, and 23 A. L. R. ( 2d) 1271
only .a few of which are heretofore cited. As applied to
this case obviously the defendant, Mr. Stevens could not
ascertain with certainty just vvhat Mr. Gray did with
the profit in the sum of $3482.02 'vhich he unlawfully
appropriated to his own use out of the Stevens-Gray
partnership. It is made to appear that the money went
into the joint account of the plaintiffs herein, and that
the money applied on the purchase of the Payson property, which is claimed as a homestead, came out of that
fund. In such case the presumption prevails that the
money that went into the purchase of the claimed exempt
property came from the money misappropriated as otherwise Mr. Gray would have testified as to what he· did
with that money.
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POINT II.
·THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
INTEREST OF LEILA GRAY IN THE PROPERTY HERE
INVOLVED IS A ONE-HALF THEREOF, IN ADDITION TO
HER RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLAIMED RIGHT
OF HER HUSBAND FOR A HOMESTEAD.

What has been said under Point One is applicable
as to the claim of the plaintiff, Leila Gray, to the claim
of her husband Fern Gray. If the clain1 of Fern Gray
fails because of the facts and the law discussed under
Point One, any claim that Leila Gray may seek to establish by reason of a claim founded on her husband's claim
1nust of necessity fail. She is in privity with her husband in so far as she seeks to avail herself of a right
to benefit by reason of the claim of a homestead right
of her husband. The word privity has been variously defined as will be seen from the text and cases cited in 72
C.J.S. pp. 954 to 962. Among the definitions on.e of
the most generally .accepted is that privies are those persons who have mutual or successive relationship to the
same rights of property or subject matter as is possessed
by the parties to the litigation as then1selves. ~Ioreover
'vhile· Mrs. Gray testifies that she " . .as opposed to 1fr.
Gray going into pa1~nership ·with ~Ir. Stevens (Tr. 31)
she did testify that she signed notes vvith him in connection with that p.artnership; that she 'vas engaged in business with her husband in other prop·erties in buying and
~elling

cattle. (Tr. 31-32). So far as appears 1\frs. Gray

was not opposed to the n1oney 'Yhich 1\fr. Gray received
for the 31 head of cattle that he 1nisappropriated going
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into their joint account .and being used for conducting
their business including the purchase of the home, which
is being claimed as exempt by both Mrs. and Mr. Gray.
It will be noted that the court found that Mrs. Gray
owned a fee simple title to a one-half interest in the
property here involved. ..A.s. we understand the law, t\vo
persons who are joint owners of a track of land are not
thereby owners in fee simple of an undivided one-half
interest therein. It will be noted that under the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 48-1-22, subdivision (c) partnership
property is liable for attachment for a partnership debt.
While the judgment here involved runs only against Mr.
Gray, if Mrs. Gray was .a silent partner, as she appears
to have been in the Stevens-Gray p.artnership, she is
liable for the money which Mr. Gray wrongfully appropriated from that partnership. We shall have more to
say about the joint ownership of the Payson property
later in this brief.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RICHARD AND DEON GRAY HAVE A VALID AND BINDING MORTGAGE ON THE PREMISES HERE INVOLVED IN
THE SUM OF $1588.02 OR IN ANY OTHER SUM. (R. 12)

There are, to put it mildly, a number of circumBtances surrounding the giving of the second mortgage
here involved which indicate that the sole purpose in
giving the same was an attempt to fortify the claim of
a homestead exemption. On direct examination, Mr. Gray
first testified th.at there was around $1600.00 owing on
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tention was called to the allegation of his complaint that
$1588.00 was due, he testified that there had been quite
a little paid since that was dra\vn up and when aided
further by questions by his counsel, he said not a dime
had been paid. (Tr. 11). On cross-examination, he testified that when he gave the mortgage he knew that a
very substantial judgment was about to be rendered
against him. (Tr. 17). By his homestead declaration he
placed the value of the Payson property at 12,500.00 but
he testified at the trial that it was not worth over $12,000.00. The note of $11,000.00 and the claimed interest
thereon makes up an amount necessary to support the
claim for a complete exemption on the assumption that
the full exemption can be taken out of ~ir. Gray's interest
in the property.
Richard Gray testified that the money he loaned to
his parents w;as all cash, $500.00 his wife had in Zion's
Savings Bank at Salt Lake, $300.00 in a bank at Payson
and $300.00 in cash they had in the house; that he did
not ask for the Inortgage. (Tr. 36-37) Not a centila of
documentary evidence was offered in support of the
claim as to where the money came from that is claimed
to have been loaned. For some reason, not accounted
for, the daughter-in-law was not called to testify. An
examination of the note will reve~al that it has none of
the characteristics that one would expect in an instrument that was clai1ned to be more than five years old
at the time of a trial. If a :family scheme such as is
revealed by the evidence in this case is to receive judicial
approval, then indeed the language above quoted in the
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statute providing for a homestead exemption instead of
providing for the general welfare would operate as an
immor.al and baneful influence undermining and destroying the fundamental principles of government.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ON
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE AND PARTICULARLY
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PLAIN'TIFF FERN GRAY
MISAPPROPRIATED 31 HEAD OF ·CATTLE BELONGING
TO THE PARTNERSHIP OF GRAY AND STEVENS. (R. 12)

It will be seen that the Court below found that the
allegations and averments of plaintiffs' complaint are
true - that all of the denials .and allegations and averments of said answer and amended answer adverse to
and inconsistent with plaintiffs' complaint are untrue.
Such a so-called finding has been repeatedly condemned
by this court. Baker v. f!atch. 76 Ut. 1, 257 Pac. 673.
Numerous other Utah cases where the same doctrine is
announced will be found collected in foot notes 2 and 3
of 257 Pac. at page 67 4. The court makes no findings
that in case No. 14,240 civil the court made the findings
alleged in the .additional answer of the defendant. (R. 9).
While the plaintiff, Fern Gray, denied the facts there
found as we have heretofore pointed out, he is bound
by such findings. The defendant is entitled to a finding
in conformity with his allegations contained in his additional answer. (R. 9). Apparently the court found to
the contrary.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
POINT· V.
T'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW THAT THE JUDGMENT OF EDWARD R. STEVENS
IS NOT A LIEN ON THE INTEREST OF FERN GRAY IN
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND IN ENTERING
JUDGMEN·T IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS FERN GRAY AND
LEILA GRAY QUIETING IN THEM THE TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED FREE FROM THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT EDWARD R.
STEVENS IN ·CASE NO. 14, 240 (R. 14-15)

It is provided in U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-8 that:
"It shall be the privilege of either the husband or the wife to claim and select a homestead
to the full extent prescribed in this title on the
failure of the other, being the judgment debtor,
to make such claim or s-election."
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-6 provides that:
"If the homestead claimant is married, the
homeste~d may be selected from the separate property of the husband otlwith the consent of the
wife from her separate property."
In this case the property h~ere involved was doubtless a homestead of the plaintiffs "ithout the formal act
of making the declaration indicated by Exhibit P-4. A
homestead, as the authorities teach, is for the protection
of the husband and \\rife and other men1bers of the fanrily.
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-5 provides that the phase "head of
a family as used in this title includes "ithin its meaning:
1. The husband and wife, 'vhen the clain1ant is a
married person, but in no case are both husband and
wife entitled e:ach to a homeBtead."

,
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It was urged in the Court below that the case of
Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 Pac. (2d) 674
gives support to the claim that plaintiff Fern Gray may
make a selection of a homestead to the full amount of
$2750.00 because he is ,a joint owner of the property
here involved. There are various reasons why that case
is not controlling in this case. In that case the wife had
taken a mortgage on her husband's intere,st in a tract
of land held as tenants in common by the husband and
wife. The husband had taken $5000.00 from a joint account and made a poor investment of the same. The· wife
objected to the husband making the investment; the husband gave a note to the wife for $4500.00, which he renewed for $5220.00 and gave .a mortgage on prope-rty
owned by the husband and wife as tenants in common
which, ho,vever, was not occupied by them as their home.
In this case the money which Mr. Gray unlawfully appropriated went into the joint account of the plaintiffs
and thus enriched both of the plaintiffs. Neither of the
plaintiffs accounted for the money misappropriated and
that being so, the presumption is that it went into the
purchase of the home. The language above quoted,
namely "in no case are both husband and wife entitled
each to a homestead" cannot, without ignoring its plain
meaning, be construed to me:an that the plaintiffs are
each entitled to $2750.00. The interest that Mrs. Gray
owned in the Payson property was as much a part of
the Gray homestead as was the interest of Mr. Gray.
To hold otherwise would be to engage in a process of
metaphysical reasoning which has no place in law. It
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will further be noted that the statutes U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-6
and 28-1-8 permits the selection to be made out of the
separate property of the husband or the wife. In this caBe
the interest which ~1r. Gray had in the Payson property
was in no sense his separate property. Quite the contrary, property held in joint tenancy by a husband and
'vife may not be said to be held in severalty by the husband and wife. We do not contend that a husband and
wife are not entitled to a homestead in the amount fixed
by law in .a home jointly owned. If the decision app·ealed
from is permitted to stand, it will mean that the Grays
are entitle~d to twice the amount of homestead exemption
that is permitted by the statute. It has become a common
practice for a husband and wife to take title to a home
as joint tenants. It may be inquired is there any reason
why in such case if a judg1nent is rendered against one
of the spous:es the full amount of exemption should be
allowed such spouse and in addition thereto the interest
of the other spouse should remain intact, while on the
other hand, if a judgment is rendered against a spouse
holding the entire title, the limit of the homestead exemption is that fixed by law.
It is said by this court in the case of Kemball v.
Lewis, 17 Ut. 381, 53 Pac. 1037, that the l1omeste:ad act
"was intended to secure and protect the home
against creditors and as a 1neans of support to
every family in the state."
That being the purpose of the homestead law, there is
no reason why ;a husband and wife who hold the title to
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a home as joint tenants are entitled to a greater protection than are. those who may have the title in the name
of the spouse against whon1 a judgment is rendered. To
hold otherwise would constitute class legislation and offend against the provisions of Article VI, See. 26, subdivision 18, Constitution of Utah, wherein it is provided
that:
"In all cases where a general law can he applicable~, no special law shall be enacted."
If !fr. Gray may succe!ssfully claim a homestead for
the full amount out of his share in the Payson property
free from a judgment against him, by the same token
Mrs. Gray may succeed in rnaking a claim of a homestead for the full amount of her :i,nterest in the Payson
property. Mr. Gray cannot deprive Mrs. Gray of a right
to 1nake a homestead claim by himself making such a
claim. Attention is again called to the provisions of
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-5 which provides that either the husband or the wife may make the selection, but in no case
are both husband and wife entitled to a homestead.
The right to a homestead is the creature of statutory law. The common law does not grant a right to a
homestead. We have examined a number of statutes and
decisions of the various states .and have been unable to
find two states that have identical laws. Thus in some
states property held by two or more persons as joint
tenants is not subject to a homestead exemption. In
others it may be, especially if the joint tenants are husband and wife. See 40 C.J.S. Sec.; 88, page 140. In some
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~tates

where a homestead is held jointly by a husband
and wife, each must contribute one-half to the homestead.
The case of Johnson v. Nuntz, 364 Ill. 482, 4 N.E. (2d)
826 is such a case. A similar doctrine seems to be the
law in Oklahoma. Mitchell v. Quinton, 116 Pac. (2d) 995.
We, however, do not wish to undertake to discuss the
various laws dealing with homesteads. To do that would
extend this brief beyond reasonable limits, but would
probably be of little, if any, aid in the proper construction of the statutes of Utah.
Bec.ause of the reasons herein stated, it is submitted
that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and
this court direct the court below to enter judgment denying the plaintiff )j-,ern Gray any homestead right in and
to the property here involved.

Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorney for appellant
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

